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COPYRIGHT LAW-LIBRARIANS WHO TEACH: EXPANDING 
THE DISTANCE EDUCATION RIGHTS OF LIBRARIES BY ApPLYING 
THE TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION AND COPYRIGHT HARMONIZATION 
ACT OF 2002 
INTRODUCTION 
Scott, a reference librarian at an academic library, opens his e­
mail and finds a request from a faculty member. Professor Smiler 
has asked that a copyrighted report and clips of a video owned by 
the library be scanned and made available electronically to the stu­
dents in his on-campus Adolescent Development class. Scott 
knows he has the technical capacity to comply with the request, but 
he is concerned: Is such a use permitted under copyright law? 
Does he, as a librarian, have sufficient privileges with respect to the 
copyrighted material to comply with Professor Smiler's request? 
Another librarian, Ken, has coffee with Professor Smiler. In 
passing, Professor Smiler mentions that his Gender Development 
class will be discussing images of men from popular media. Ken 
knows the library owns many contemporary magazines and won­
ders if he could find images that would be useful to Professor 
Smiler and his class. Not wanting Professor Smiler to get his hopes 
up, Ken does not mention the magazines. Later, Ken sorts through 
back issues, marking images he intends to offer to Professor Smiler. 
Ken wonders if he may digitize these images and post them online 
for Professor Smiler and his class. 
Across campus, Emily, an instructional technology designer, 
opens an e-mail fromProfessorSmiler.This time, Professor Smiler 
requests that some textual and audiovisual material be added to the 
course space l he uses for his distance education Child Development 
section. Emily also evaluates the request, and comes to the same 
conclusion as Scott: she is capable of posting the material, but she is 
not sure whether she may. 
Despite the similarity of their positions, Emily, Ken, and Scott 
may have different privileges with regard to providing access to 
copyrighted materials-even though they are staff members at the 
1. "Course space" refers to the electronic delivery mechanism of distance educa­
tion, whether this is a simple web page or a more complex technological setup. 
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same nonprofit institution of higher education, even though they 
are assisting the same faculty member, and even though they may 
ultimately be serving some of the same students. This Note will 
examine some of the ways in which their privileges may differ, how 
these privileges should be interpreted, and argue that these privi­
leges should be similarly broad. 
Legislatures have long enacted copyright laws in response to 
technological changes.2 The 1976 Copyright Revision Act, a gen­
eral revision of the nation's copyright laws and the basis of modern 
copyright law in the U.S., was in part a response to such changes.3 
As copyright principles are applied to new technologies, unforeseen 
aspects of the technology can create unintended consequences; 
problems of this sort have been apparent in distance education.4 
Congress updated the copyright laws in 2002 to specifically address 
ambiguities and concerns created by new technology.s 
Distance education has been a growing industry since well 
before the age of the Internet. While the first incarnation of dis­
tance education consisted of correspondence courses,6 later incar­
nations have incorporated technology such as broadcast television, 
cable television, video recordings, and more recently the Internet. 
The modern form of distance education, sometimes referred to as 
online education, typically consists of asynchronous instructional 
modules created by the professor and conducted by the student at 
his leisure. It can also include scheduled, real-time interactive ses­
sions between groups of students and the professors and communi­
cation among the students to discuss the subject matter and 
complete assigned projects.7 Courses of this type are offered by a 
2. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) 
(identifying the development of the printing press and photocopy machines as influenc­
ing copyright law); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 47 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 75-S523­
22 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (identifying issues surrounding cable television as delaying the 
passage of the Copyright Revision Act). 
3. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.ll. 
4. See generally Kristine H. Hutchinson, The TEACH Act: Copyright Law and 
Online Education, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2204 (2003). 
5. [d. 
6. Robert Thornburg, The Impact of Copyright Law on Distance Education Pro­
grams: How Fair Use and the CONFU Guidelines May Shape the Future of Academia, 
27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 321, 325 (2003). 
7. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE EDU· 
CATION 54-57 (1999), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf; Jon 
Garon, The Electronic Jungle: The Application of Intellectual Property Law To Distance 
Education, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 146, 149 (2002); Thornburg, supra note 6, at 
326-29. 
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variety of institutions, ranging from independent subject-oriented 
organizations, to for-profit educational institutions, to accredited 
nonprofit colleges and universities.8 Many traditional universities 
have begun offering distance education courses and have added dis­
tance education elements to traditional courses offered in person.9 
Students who attend traditional classes on the campus of an 
accredited college or university have access to that institution's li­
braries and the variety of services that these libraries provide. Dis­
tance education students, on the other hand, may not have access to 
the institution's libraries in person. Over the years, libraries have 
developed services specifically designed to accommodate the needs 
of distance education students. At present, many libraries provide 
some services over the Internet, much as professors provide instruc­
tional materials over the Internet.10 
Some of the practices in distance education during the 1990s 
conflicted with copyright law until the passage of the Technology, 
Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002 (TEACH).11 
TEACH updated copyright law to ensure that distance educators 
would be permitted to take advantage of Internet technology in de­
veloping online curricula, while protecting the interests of copyright 
owners. However, TEACH did not specifically include libraries in 
its provisions, so the degree to which libraries may take advantage 
of this new act remains unclear. 
In an effort to explore the possible advantages libraries may 
have under TEACH, Part I of this Note will review the develop­
ment of copyright law and examine the classroom exemption built 
into the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. It will then examine the 
ways in which copyright laws were inadequate to deal with the re­
cent developments in distance education technology and practices 
and discuss the legislative remedy. Part II will review the fair use 
8. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 20-21. 
9. Garon, supra note 7, at 147-48. 
10. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 16-17; see Meredith Ault, Thinking 
Outside the Library: How to Develop, Implement and Promote Library Services for Dis­
tance Learners, in DISTANCE LEARNING LIBRARY SERVICES: THE TENTH OFF-CAMPUS 
LIBRARY SERVICES CONFERENCE 39, 43-46 (Patrick B. Mahoney ed., 2002) (describing 
trends in library services to distance learners); Anne Marie Casey et aI., Fair is Fair, or 
Is It? Library Services to Distance Learners, in DISTANCE LEARNING LIBRARY SER­
VICES: THE TENTH OFF-CAMPUS LIBRARY SERVICES CONFERENCE, supra, at 147, 148­
60 (describing services to distance learners at three academic libraries). 
11. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act of 
2002, § 13301, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1910 (codified at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101, 
110, 112, and 801 (Supp. 2004»; see discussion infra Part I.c. 
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doctrine and its role in permitting uses of copyrighted materials by 
non-owners.12 A fair use determination may buttress a library's 
conclusion that a particular activity would be copyright-permissible 
under an expanded reading of TEACH. Libraries may place 
greater confidence in a decision to act if it is arguably supported 
both by an expanded TEACH analysis and also their fair use analy­
sis. Part II will conclude with a description of the Classroom 
Guidelines and other non-legislative guidelines developed coopera­
tively to guide educators in their application of the copyright laws. 
Part III will argue for the inclusion of some library activities into 
coverage by TEACH, based on public policy, fair use, and consis­
tency in copyright law. 
I. CLASSROOM USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL 
Copyright is fundamentally a way of encouraging the creation 
of new and creative works within society.13 To that end, original 
expressions of ideas are registrable as copyrighted materials.14 
Copyright owners have the exclusive rights 
to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . to prepare derivative 
works ... to distribute copies ... by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; . . . to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly ... to display the copyrighted work 
publicly; and ... to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission.15 
Specific legislative provisions also permit certain people­
among them classroom teachers-to make some additional uses 
that are exempt from liability for copyright infringement.16 Addi­
tionally, non-owners are permitted to make "fair use" of copy­
12. "Owners" refers to those who own copyright in a particular work, whether 
they are the creator discussed in the constitutional provision or an assignee. "Non­
owners" refers to anyone who does not own copyright with respect to a particular work. 
Non-owners mayor may not have any rights to a work acquired by license or other 
means. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8 (noting the promotion of the "Progress of Science 
and useful Arts"); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
558 (1985) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 209 (1954»; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Uni­
versal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984). 
14. See 17 U.S.c. § 102 (2000). 
15. 17 U.S.c. § 106 (2000). 
16. 17 U.S.c. § 110 (2000); see discussion infra Part I.B. Section 108 provides a 
"library exemption" which does not address the sorts of library services discussed here, 
such as the making of archival copies of library materials. 17 U.S.c. § 108 (2000). 
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righted materialP The exemption for classroom uses and the fair 
use doctrine are alternative ways a non-owner may justify use of 
copyrighted material. 18 Thus, a particular use may be justified as a 
fair use in a classroom setting even if the use does not fall into the 
classroom exemption. 
This Part will review the general purposes of copyright in the 
United States. It will then discuss the permissible uses that non­
owners may make of copyrighted materials under the classroom ex­
emption included in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. This Part 
then explores the purposes and passage of the TEACH Act. Fi­
nally, this Part identifies and clarifies how the provisions of 
TEACH are ambiguous with respect to libraries. 
A. Purposes of Copyright Law 
According to the Constitution, the goal of copyright is to "pro­
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. "19 The Framers of 
the Constitution chose to achieve this goal by "securing ... to Au­
thors . . . the exclusive right" to his or her work, but only for a 
limited time.20 This provides an economic incentive for authors to 
create new work, by protecting their ability to earn a living from 
their labors. There are several ways in which the "exclusive right" 
of the author-the initial copyright owner-is limited under copy­
right law, and in which the rights of other individuals-non-own­
ers-to use the works are permitted, including the classroom 
exemption and fair use.21 
"Progress [in] Science and useful Arts" requires the use of 
prior scholarship by later authors.22 The time limitation operates to 
allow use of a work once the author has gained some economic 
benefit from his creation, but while the subsequent use is still bene­
ficial to society at large. Both the time limitation in the Copyright 
Clause, and the justification of "promot[ion of] the Progress of Sci­
17. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see discussion infra Part II. 
18. Hutchinson, supra note 4, at 2217. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
20. Id. 
21. See 17 U.S.c. § 106 (providing the copyrights reserved to the creator of a 
work, as limited by the restrictions in §§ 107-118). 
22. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984) (describing the fundamental tension of copyright as that "between the interests 
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries 
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, 
and commerce on the other hand"). 
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ence and useful Arts," imply that copyright protection was never 
intended to be all-encompassing.23 
B. The Pre-TEACH Classroom Exemption 
One major way in which uses by non-owners were justified 
under the 1976 Act was through the classroom exemption. Class­
rooms were established as places of special privilege in relation to 
copyrighted materials. Narrow exemptions were provided for 
them, based on a policy of encouraging the socially valuable uses of 
these materials.24 The classroom exemption, located in § 110, al­
lows copying and display of materials for in-class use.25 Specifically, 
subsection (1) permits performance or display of any work during 
"face-to-face" teaching activities, in a "nonprofit educational insti­
tution," and "in a classroom or similar place."26 The "face-to-face" 
restrictions clearly limit the applicability of this subsection to in­
person educational interactions, eliminating any application of this 
section to distance learning environmentsP Subsection (2), appli­
cable to distance learning, permitted the broadcasting of certain 
works during the "systematic instructional activities" that were "di­
rectly related ... to the teaching content. "28 Further limiting this 
allowance was the requirement that the transmission be received 
"in classrooms or similar places" or by people of whom classroom 
attendance was considered unreasonable to require.29 
During the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,3° 
Congress requested a report from the Register of Copyrights re­
garding the challenges posed by copyright law to distance education 
practices.31 This report, delivered to Congress in 1999, analyzed the 
current nature of distance education, its status and practice in the 
United States, the technologies used, and the impact of copyright 
23. u.s. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
24. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 61-62 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 75-S523-22 
(Cong. Info. Serv.). 
25. 17 U.S.c. § 110(1)-(2) (2000). These exemptions have since been modified by 
the Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, see infra note 33. 
26. § 110(1). 
27. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 81 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695. 
28. § 110(2). 
29. § 110(2)(C). Such people include those with disabilities or other "special cir­
cumstances," and governmental officers and employees receiving the transmission "as 
part of their official duties or employment." Id. 
30. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.c.). 
31. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 403. 
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law on distance educators.32 The 1999 copyright report prompted 
the development of the Technology, Education, and Copyright Har­
monization Act of 2002.33 
C. 	 Congress Confronts the Growing Necessity of Expanded 
Copyright Provisions for Distance Education 
TEACH was intended to alleviate some of the frustration felt 
by distance educators. By 1999, it was clear that the classroom ex­
emptions were not supporting distance education as sufficiently as 
they had in 1976. The failure of the statutory language to accom­
modate the needs of distance educators did not stem from a lack of 
Congressional will to benefit distance education, but from the de­
velopment of new technology. In fact, the second classroom ex­
emption included in the 1976 Act, located in § 110(2), "cover[ed] 
the forms of distance education existing when the statute was cre­
ated."34 The methods primarily used at the time were "open or 
closed-circuit television and radio broadcasts,"35 as opposed to to­
day's delivery via the Internet. 
The Copyright Office report noted several problems that had 
been created by the ways in which technology described in the 1976 
statutory language varied from new technologies used in distance 
education.36 The 1976 Conference Committee had declared that 
"[t]here appears to be no need for a statutory definition of 'face-to­
face' teaching activities," noting that these were any displays that 
were not "transmitted."37 While that may have been enough clarifi­
cation under the extant technology in 1976, it did not remain clear 
to distance educators. The introduction of synchronous interactive 
and video technology blurred the line between in-person and dis­
tance education, and "face-to-face" became an ambiguous term.38 
32. 	 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7. 
33. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301, 116 Stat. 1758,1910 (codified at 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 
110, 112, and 801 (Supp. 2004». 
34. 	 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at vii (emphasis added). 
35. 	 Id. at 77. 
36. The Copyright Office report also deals with several problems not addressed 
by this Note, including the types of materials permitted for display. Id. at 78-79. 
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 81 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.CCA.N. 5659, 5695. 
38. For the first time, technology allowed a teacher and student to see and hear 
each other, and interact live, without being in the same physical location. The term that 
had been used to define in-person education no longer did so exclusively. 
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Additionally, concern arose regarding the technical side-effects 
of digital transmission: as a system transmitted the materials, it cre­
ated a copy, albeit a temporary one, as part of the process.39 
Neither § 110(1) nor (2) authorized the making of copies for use in 
an educational broadcast merely for performance and display.40 
Although these temporary copies were not retained on either end 
of the broadcast, their mere existence implicated the copyright 
owner's exclusive right of reproduction. The technologically neu­
tral wording of the statute was not sufficient to indicate that digital 
transmissions were to be permitted.41 
Finally, the shift from a location-based distance learning sys­
tem to a networked, location-independent scheme created 
problems under § 110(2). Previously, broadcasts may have been di­
rected to a classroom or to people in special circumstances;42 under 
the modern technological model the ability to "attend" from a 
horne or office is a primary draw for distance education students.43 
While the "special circumstances" provision of § 110(2) would cer­
tainly apply to some distance learners, it would likely not apply to 
those who choose distance education for reasons of convenience.44 
This distinction would create two classes of distance learners for 
whom different displays would be permitted and would necessarily 
complicate the legal status of an educator's actions. 
D. Overview of TEACH Provisions 
TEACH expands into the electronic world the rights of educa­
tors to use copyrighted materials for distance education purposes.45 
Organizations must meet strict requirements with regard to who is 
eligible to take advantage of the provisions, what materials may be 
used, the way in which the materials are used, and the technological 
safeguards that are erected. These requirements protect the rights 
39. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 83. 
40. Id. at 78. The right to reproduction is granted to the copyright owner under 
§ 106(1); the rights to performance and display are granted in §§ 106(4), (5), and (6). 
41. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 83. 
42. This use would have satisfied the requirements of the 1976 statute. See supra 
text accompanying notes 25-29. 
43. See, e.g., University of Phoenix, University of Phoenix Online, http://online. 
phoenix.edu (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) (listing as a benefit the ability to "[a ]ttend class 
online when and where you want" and touting this as the "most convenient and effi­
cient way possible" to earn a college degree). 
44. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 84. 
45. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301, 116 Stat. 1758, 1910 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
110, 112, and 801 (Supp. 2004». 
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of copyright owners by narrowing the field of uses permitted under 
TEACH. 
TEACH replaced the outdated classroom exemption, § 110, 
with a more technologically inclusive exemption. Under this new 
exemption, copyrighted materials may be displayed only by "gov­
ernment[al] bod[ies] or ... accredited nonprofit educational insti­
tution[s]."46 This proVIsIon is an attempt to restrict the 
organizations that may use the privilege to bona fide educational 
organizations.47 
Materials must be used "at the direction of, or under the actual 
supervision of an instructor," and "as an integral part of a class ses­
sion offered as a regular part of the systematic mediated instruc­
tional activities."48 "Mediated instructional activities" are defined 
as "activities that use [copyrighted materials] as an integral part of 
the class experience, controlled by or under the actual supervision 
of the instructor and analogous to the type of performance or dis­
play that would take place in a live classroom setting."49 Notably, 
this eliminated the requirement of a classroom setting for the recep­
46. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1) (codified at 17 U.s.c. § 110(2)). 
47. This is an imperfect limitation; some legitimate educational organizations are 
eliminated by this definition. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9 (2001), microformed on CIS 
No. 01-S523-1 (Cong. Info. Serv.). While there may be many worthy organizations that 
are either not accredited or are for-profit, the authors of TEACH drew the line there to 
restrict the potential negative effects of TEACH. This includes in TEACH most major 
mainstream outlets of higher education, while excluding for-profit "diploma mills" and 
other suspect organizations. See generally Bogus Degrees and Unmet Expectations: Are 
Taxpayer Dollars Subsidizing Diploma Mills?: Hearings Before the Comm. on Govern­
mental Affairs, 108th Congo (2004), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.netI7l257/2422/ 
07sep20041200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdfIl08hrgl94487.pdf. Also exclu­
ded, however, are legitimate for-profit, accredited entities. See, e.g., Concord Law 
School, Executive Juris DoctorSM Program Disclosure Statement 1 (Jan. 2007), http:// 
kucampus.kaplan.edu/DocumentStore/kuDocs/concord/cls3jddis_2.pdf (noting the 
school's status as a division of Kaplan, Inc. and noting accreditation by the Accrediting 
Commission of the Distance Education and Training Council). Similarly excluded are 
many nonprofit organizations, such as professional associations, which may offer train­
ing and educational courses to its members, but are not accredited as an educational 
organization. Federally recognized accrediting bodies accredit some professional as­
sociations, such as the National Court Reporters Association. Nat'l Court Reporters 
Ass'n, Continuing Education, http://ncraonline.orglEducCertification/ContinuingEd 
(last visited Jan. 7,2007) (noting the accreditation of the NCRA Continuing Education 
programs by the Accrediting Council for Continuing Education and Training). Numer­
ous other professional organizations, such as the American Association of Law Librar­
ies, provide continuing education for their members, without any mention of 
accreditation. See Am. Ass'n of Law Libraries, Professional Development Policy and 
Structure (1996), available at http://www.aallnet.orglabout/policy_pro_dev.asp. 
48. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1)(A) (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 1l0(2)(A)). 
49. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(2) (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 110). 
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tion of educational transmissions. Congress intended, as much as 
possible, to give distance educators the same privileges enjoyed by 
traditional educators, without expanding those rights.50 Addition­
ally, the display of copyrighted material must be "directly related 
and of material assistance to the teaching content of the transmis­
sion."51 Congress explicitly stated its intention not to expand the 
covered activities to include research conducted outside of class.52 
It did, however, allow more types of materials to be broadcast in 
distance education settings.53 TEACH also established that tempo­
rary network copies of works created during transmission are not 
considered infringements under the copyright law. 
TEACH imposed technological criteria as well as substantive 
ones. The materials used must be protected by security systems, 
which are required "to the extent technologically feasible" to limit 
the receipt of the materials to legitimate users (i.e., enrolled stu­
dents).54 Again, this addresses the concerns of use by outside users 
through hacking or compromised technological systems. In addi­
tion, the organization must employ technological safeguards that 
"reasonably prevent" users from retaining or re-transmitting the 
copyrighted materials. 55 The transmissions allowed under the new 
provisions of § 110(2) must "appl[y] technological measures that ... 
prevent retention ... for longer than the class session; and unautho­
rized further dissemination" of the materials used.56 This ensures 
that the materials are used for their intended educational purposes, 
but no more. This specific attempt to protect the materials used 
through digital media follows a trend in copyright legislation, and is 
similar in intent to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.57 Any 
50. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 4. 
51. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1)(B) (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 11O(2)(B)). 
52. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9-10. 
53. 147 CONGo REC. 3014-16 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
54. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1)(C) (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 110(2)(C)). 
55. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(2)(D)(ii)(I) (codified at 17 U.S.c. 
§ 1l0(2)(D)(ii)(I)). 
56. 17 U.S.c. §§ 110(2)(D)(ii)(I), (E)(ii) (Supp. 2003). 
57. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.c. (2000)). Both statutes use tech­
nological safeguards to protect intellectual property rights. Some argue that these pro­
visions imperil legitimate uses of copyrighted materials through excess protections of 
copyright owners. See, e.g., Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational 
Fair Use, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 1,44-47 (2002) (describing technologies such as "pay-per­
play" that prevent educational users from taking advantage of fair use privileges); see 
also 17 U.S.c. § 1l0(2)(D)(ii) (specifying that the transmitter may not interfere with 
protections used by the copyright owners). 
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uses that fall outside these bounds would, of course, be permissible 
if there were some additional copyright privilege or license. 
E. 	 Ambiguity of TEACH Provisions as Applied to Library 
Services 
The language of TEACH does not explicitly include libraries; 
however, the inclusion of acts taken "at the direction of ... the 
instructor"58 leaves open the possibility that libraries would be pro­
tected from liability for some acts that might otherwise be consid­
ered infringements. Very little guidance is provided in the 
legislative history regarding what this "direction" refers to. The 
only example is that of a display being "initiated by a person en­
rolled in the class as long as it is done either at the direction, or 
under the actual supervision, of the instructor."59 Exactly what this 
means is unclear. This specifically does not require "constant, real­
time supervision by the instructor," which may allow actions taken 
by librarians.60 The extent of the "direction" given by the instruc­
tor with respect to the actions of librarians is a key issue in deter­
mining whether the act should be permitted under an expanded 
reading of TEACH. 
To be considered an appropriate use under an expanded read­
ing of TEACH, the use must be a "regular part" of a "mediated 
instructional activit[y]."61 The realm of possible actions can be vi­
sualized as a spectrum, from uses that are an integral part of, or 
closely connected to, the qualifying activity to uses that are only 
distantly related to, or sparsely connected to, the qualifying activity. 
An example of a clearly connected use is one in which library staff 
only provides administrative support at the request of an educator 
(perhaps merely acquiring identified material, or providing techno­
logical assistance in making it available to users) and where the ma­
terial is then used in a classroom presentation. At the other 
extreme, an example of a connection too attenuated to support the 
conclusion that it is TEACH-appropriate would be when a librarian 
independently identifies, acquires, and makes available supplemen­
tary materials that are not then incorporated into classroom 
presentations. Activities between these two extremes could include 
varying degrees of independent action and selection by librarians, 
58. 	 § 1l0(2)(A). 
59. S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9 (2001), microformed on CIS No. 01-S523-1 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.). 
60. 	 Id. 
61. 	 § 1l0(2)(A). 
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but with the material being reviewed, evaluated, and used by the 
instructor. 
Some library activities are specifically mentioned as not being 
analogous to the activities to which TEACH is addressed. The 
House Committee Report mentions "student use of supplemental 
or research materials ... such as ... e-reserves, and digital library 
resources" as being beyond the scope of TEACH.62 A more so­
phisticated analysis of the types of services libraries provide indi­
cates that these services go far beyond provision of "supplemental 
[and] research materials" and that characterizing the extent of li­
brary activities as "e-reserves[] and digital library resources" may 
paint library activities with too broad a brush. Many library activi­
ties or services provided today are used within a classroom or dis­
tance education context, and are more fundamental to the 
classroom presentation than those apparently anticipated by Con­
gress. Displays provided by libraries that are used for classroom 
presentations (or the distance equivalent), rather than for ancillary 
study, should be considered appropriate for this protection.63 
TEACH expressly attempted to balance the increased rights of 
use and display under educational circumstances with protections 
for the rights of copyright owners.64 Both the distance education 
and library communities are trying to measure its impact and adjust 
to its requirements and allowances.65 The sense of the library liter­
ature is that the application of TEACH to libraries is uncertain, and 
the best course of action is to develop a policy based on a good­
faith attempt to understand the scope of copyright law and abide by 
the policy in their use of copyrighted workS.66 Libraries long accus­
62. H.R. REP. No. 107-687, at 10 (2002), microformed on CIS No. 02-H523-44 
(Cong. Info. Serv.). 
63. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9. Technology such as electronic reserves systems 
may be used to provide library services more broadly than described in the report. The 
mere use of "e-reserves[ ] and digital library resources" technology should not exclude 
an otherwise appropriately directed and mediated use from protection under the Act. 
The characteristics of the use, rather than the technology used, should govern this 
determination. 
64. 147 CONGo REC. 3011, 3012 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
65. For distance education approaches, see, e.g., MARC LINDSEY, COPYRIGHT 
LAW ON CAMPUS 35-37, 51-52 (2003). For library approaches, see, e.g., GRETCHEN Mc­
CORD HOFFMANN, COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE 2: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR LI· 
BRARIANS 55-56, 85-86, 138 (2005); CARRIE RUSSELL, COMPLETE COPYRIGHT: AN 
EVERYDAY GUIDE FOR LIBRARIANS 50 (2004); LORI DRISCOLL, ELECTRONIC RE. 
SERVE: A MANUAL AND GUIDE FOR LIBRARY STAFF MEMBERS 42-43 (2003). 
66. RUSSELL, supra note 65, at 50. 
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tomed to analyzing copyright issues through the lens of fair use 
struggle to apply the new strictures. 
II. FAIR USE 
This Part will review the permissible uses that non-owners may 
make of copyrighted materials under the fair use doctrine. After an 
examination of the fair use analysis, it will discuss the creation of 
non-legislative guidelines, i.e., the agreements between the educa­
tional community and the publishing community regarding what 
uses were agreed upon as "fair" in the educational arena. It will 
conclude with an examination of cases related to these guidelines. 
A. History of Fair Use 
Some of the permissible uses reserved to non-owners come 
under the fair use rubric, a judicial doctrine tempering the rights of 
copyright owners to the benefit of society.67 Fair use was estab­
lished in American case law in the mid-nineteenth century in Fol­
som v. Marsh.68 Folsom involved the republication of several 
letters by George Washington, previously published only in a 
twelve-volume set by the plaintiffs.69 The defendants excerpted the 
"most instructive, useful and interesting" letters in a two-volume 
set.7° Folsom discussed whether the defendants' use of the plain­
tiffs' material was an infringement on their copyright, or justified by 
public policy.71 
The 1976 Act codified the long-standing factors involved in a 
modern fair-use analysis, at 17 U.S.c. § 107: 
[F]air use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criti­
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop­
ies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made 
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include­
67. See Sharp, supra note 57, at 5 (noting the importance of the "dissemination of 
information"). 
68. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
69. Id. at 345. 
70. Id. at 348. 
71. Id. The description of the fair use in Folsom involves "the nature and objects 
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in 
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of 
the original work." Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that "[m]any mixed ingredi­
ents enter into the discussion of such questions." [d. 
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa­
tional purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela­
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.72 
B. Fair Use Analysis 
The 1976 enactment of § 107 was intended neither to change 
nor "freeze" the judicially created doctrine of fair use, but only to 
give a "very broad statutory explanation" and provide "some of the 
criteria applicable to it."73 The Senate Report specifically men­
tioned that the courts must have the ability to flexibly apply the 
doctrine in each instance.74 It also mentioned that the list was not 
exclusive; other factors may be applied as the court deems neces­
sary in an individual circumstance. Courts routinely recite the fac­
tual nature of the fair use determination.75 
Naturally, any determination that relies heavily on a flexible 
application of the doctrine to the facts in each particular case will 
not provide the certainty of a bright-line ruling. Practitioners at­
tempting to make this determination, however, are supported by 
hundreds of years of cases applying the doctrine.76 Librarians at­
tempting fair use determinations also rely on a plethora of tools 
such as checklists that assist non-lawyers in approximating a fair use 
determination,77 
72. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.c. 
§ 107) (emphasis added) (generally revising the copyright laws). 
73. S. REp. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975), micro/armed on CIS No. 75-S523-22 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.). 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 
(1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CAN. 5659, 5679-80). 
76. See, e.g., Macmillan v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 
F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). For English cases see, for example, Tonson 
v. Walker, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (1752). 
77. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 65, at 21; COPYRIGHT MGMT. CTR., CHECKLIST 
FOR FAIR USE, hup:/Icopyrightiupui.edu/checklist.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
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1. Fair Use Factors 
The first factor in a modern fair use determination is the "pur­
pose and character of the use. "78 The statutory language and re­
ports surrounding the passage of the 1976 copyright revision 
indicate that another concern addressed by this factor is whether 
the use is made for a profit, which is disfavored.79 While modern 
cases emphasize skepticism of commercial uses, there is no pre­
sumption that a commercial use is not fair. 80 One of the concerns 
with a commercial use is "whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the custom­
ary price," i.e., a licensing fee.81 Educational uses are favored, but 
an educational use does not create a presumption of fair use.82 Fi­
nally, "transformative use[s]," those uses that produce new substan­
tive works, are often favored over others.83 
The second statutory factor, the "nature of the copyrighted 
work," distinguishes between "informational" and "entertainment" 
works.84 The guiding principle animating this factor is that works 
that are born "more of diligence" deserve less protection than 
works "of originality or inventiveness."85 A defense of fair use is 
more difficult to maintain when the copyrighted work used is one of 
originality; informational works generally receive less deference 
78. 17 U.S.c. § 107 (2000); see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 421 (2d ed. 1995). 
79. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (disclaiming an automatic exemption for non­
profit uses, but indicating that the character of the use may weigh for or against fair 
use). 
80. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (discussing par­
tial copies in the context of a parody). But see Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51 (referring 
specifically to copies of an entire original work). 
81. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
82. See S. REp. No. 94-473, at 62, 65 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 75-S523-22 
(Cong. Info. Serv.); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-67. This principle was established in 
the early twentieth century. See Macmillan v. King, 223 F. 862, 867 (D. Mass. 1914) 
(considering and declining to adopt an automatic fair use exemption for educational 
activities ). 
83. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
84. 17 U.s.c. § 107 (2000); see PATRY, supra note 78, at 504-07. Some commen­
tators claim this factor is actually discounted or dealt with in a perfunctory manner 
when analyzed. See William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Re­
form in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2004); see also Sony, 464 
U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court failed to consider the sec­
ond factor in finding a fair use). 
85. Sony, 464 U.S. at 496 (citing New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, 
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. N.J. 1977). This does not, however, protect works based 
on the "sweat of the brow" that went into their creation. See Feist Pub'ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352-56 (1991). 
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and protection than do entertainment works, and are favored as 
subjects of fair use.86 Additionally, works of fact are more impor­
tant to disseminate to society at large, and thus less deserving of 
protection under the law of fair use, than a work of fiction.87 
The third statutory factor, "amount and substantiality," in­
volves a consideration of the whole of the copyrighted work and the 
citing work.88 The permitted "amount" does not depend on a 
mathematical formula of the percentage or number of words used.89 
It can, in fact, refer to taking only the part of the copyrighted work 
that is of the "most interest and value."90 Thus, a brief passage cop­
ied from a lengthy original may fail to qualify as a fair use under 
this factor, if the portion used represents the best nugget of the 
original work.91 It is, however, important to consider the purpose 
and character of the use when evaluating the amount of copying 
that is appropriate under this factor; some uses necessarily require 
more copying to achieve the intended effect.92 
The fourth and final factor listed in the statute, the "effect of ,': 
the use on the potential market,"93 has been described as the most 
important of the four factors. 94 Once a prima facie case of market 
harm is established, the burden shifts to the defendants to prove 
that the harm would have occurred even without their use of the 
work.95 Many of the early fair use determinations involved 
abridgements of voluminous works into more accessible, and often 
less expensive, forms.96 Many of these abridgments were held to 
86. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 496. 
87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563. On this point, the dissent in Harper & Row 
agrees with the majority. Id. at 594 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
88. 17 U.S.c. § 107 (2000). 
89. PATRY, supra note 78, at 21-22. But see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Class­
room Guidelines' mathematical calculations). 
90. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (finding 
that the defendant's work selected the best parts of the plaintiff's original). 
91. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (referring to the district court's determina­
tion that the used passages represented "the heart of the book"). 
92. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-89 (1994) (discuss­
ing the amount of copying necessary for a parody to evoke the original in the minds of 
those who hear or see it). 
93. 17 U.S.c. § 107. 
94. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984). 
95. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. 
96. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 78, at 12 (discussing Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. 
Rep. 889 (K.B. 1807)). 
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have had a negative impact on the sale of the origina1.97 The poten­
tial for future harm is as important as any prior harm.98 The poten­
tial of a published work to generate income through licensing fees is 
considered relevant under this final factor.99 Even the effect of a 
work on the market for derivative works is to be considered.1°O In 
sum, any financial loss attributable to a non-owner's use of the 
copyrighted work is relevant to the inquiry. Conversely, a lack of 
showing of economic harm does not in itself create a fair use.101 
While the Senate Report did not provide a general discussion 
of the application of fair use, it specifically mentioned the fair use 
implications of classroom copying, citing the lack of judicial gui­
dance in these areas.102 Noting that nothing in § 107 or § 110 ex­
cludes materials used in the classroom from a possible fair use 
determination, the report identifies factors that would lead to a de­
termination of fair use in the classroom.103 
2. Modern Fair Use Cases 
In the early 1980s, several owners of copyrights in television 
programs sued the makers of video tape recorders (VTRs) for con­
tributing to the infringement they were allegedly enabling by mak­
ing their technology available to the public.104 The owners claimed 
that users of the VTR technology were repeatedly and illegally cop­
ying material from television, violating their copyrights.105 The Su­
preme Court found that a significant use of the technology was to 
97. See id. 
98. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
99. Steven J. Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries, and Electronic 
Reserves, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 157, 171 'II 40 (2000) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Tex­
aco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Serv., 99 
F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)). Licensing fees are a legitimate source of income under the 
protections of § 106, and thus form part of the market for a work. Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 927-31(2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the fourth factor as 
applied to the use of copyrighted journal articles). 
100. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592-94 (1994) (remanding 
for determination of the impact of a parody. on the market for non-parodic derivative 
works). 
101. PATRY, supra note 78, at 25. 
102. S. REp. No. 94-473, at 61-62 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 75-S523-22 
(Cong. Info. Serv.). In fact, the report deals very little with non-educational fair use 
examples, although it specifically disclaims that only the uses discussed in the report 
may be fair ones. Id. at 63. 
103. Id. 
104. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,420 
(1984). 
105. [d. at 419-20. 
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"time-shift" television programs, by allowing users to record a tele­
vised program and watch it at a time of their choosing.106 By time­
shifting, the audience for the programs was actually increased.107 
The Court concluded that time-shifting was a fair use within the 
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 107, focusing its inquiry on factors one (the 
purpose and character of the work) and four (the potential harm to 
the market of the original).108 
Justice Blackmun's dissent, however, alleged that the Court did 
not properly perform the fair use analysis.109 He noted that no­
where in the statute is it indicated or even implied that the making 
of single copies for personal use can be considered fair use under 
the statute.110 Additionally, the Court failed to consider the effect 
of the second and third fair use factors (the nature of the use and 
the amount of the original used); including them in his analysis led 
Justice Blackmun to conclude that the use was not fair.111 
The Supreme Court addressed fair use again the following 
year, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.11z 
The political magazine The Nation published an article that ex­
cerpted a forthcoming memoir by former President Gerald Ford.113 
Ford's publisher, Harper & Row, was under a prior contract with 
Time Magazine for the right to serialize the memoir.114 Citing the 
article's appearance in The Nation, Time withdrew from the con­
tract.115 Harper & Row sued for copyright infringement, claiming 
that the excerpts used in The Nation article constituted the "heart" 
of the manuscript and that the cancellation of the serializing con­
tract was proof of market harm.116 The Court accepted these argu­
ments and emphasized that the commercial nature of The Nation 
article was a key factor in determining that there was no fair use.H 7 
106. Id. at 421-23. 
107. See id. at 421. 
108. Id. at 442, 448-55. 
109. /d. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 464-66. 
111. Id. at 496-97 (supplying an analysis of the second and third statutory 
factors). 
112. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
113. /d. at 542-43. 
114. Id. 
115. /d. at 543. 
116. Id. at 543-44. 
117. /d. at 562-63. 
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The majority explicitly considered all four statutory factors, unlike 
the majority decision in Sony.llB 
A final landmark case considering the fair use of copyrighted 
material arose from a rap group's use of a rock song as the basis for 
a parody of the original.119 The band 2 Live Crew recorded a song 
using the first words and a musical theme of Roy Orbison's and 
William Dees's "Oh, Pretty Woman," to create the new "Pretty Wo­
man. "120 The similarity in the song titles is not reflected in their 
tones or lyrics, and two courts held that the 2 Live Crew version 
constituted social commentary and a parody of the original.121 The 
Supreme Court held that the appellate court had incorrectly deter­
mined that the parody's commercial nature created a presumption 
that the work was not a fair use and that commercial parodies 
could, indeed, be fair uses.I22 The undivided Court examined the 
peculiar nature of a parody, including the near certainty that a par­
ody will be of a well-known work and the likelihood that it will be 
commercial in nature.123 The Court was careful to note that a de­
cline in the market for a work due to criticism of it does not consti­
tute market harm under the fourth factor of the fair use statute.124 
3. Non-Legislative Guidelines 
The practical development of educational fair use has come 
about outside of the courtroom as a dance between non-owners (li­
brarians and educators) and owners (publishers ).125 During pas­
sage of the 1976 Act, Congress recommended the development of 
an understanding between these stakeholders regarding "permissi­
118. Id. at 560-68. Contra Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 
U.S. 417, 448-51 (1984) (considering only the first and fourth factors). 
119. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). 
120. Id. at 572. 
121. See id. at 581-83. 
122. Id. at 583-84. 
123. Id. at 586-91. 
124. Id. at 591-92. 
125. For an overview of the relationship between publishers' groups and educa­
tors, see Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guide­
lines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 640 (2001). 
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ble educational uses of copyrighted material. "126 As a result, the 
Classroom Guidelines were born.127 
The Classroom Guidelines were the result of private negotia­
tions between the library and educational communities and publish­
ers.128 According to the text, they were never intended to describe 
the full permissions granted to educators and librarians under fair 
use, but were instead a statement of some permissible uses.129 The 
library and educational communities desired that further uses be 
perceived as possible fair uses, but the nature of the agreement was 
that it represented the furthest extent upon which the parties could 
agree: all fair uses agreed upon by the negotiating parties were re­
flected, and anything beyond the agreement would be unacceptable 
as a fair use to one party or the otherpo As a result, rather than 
serving as a springboard for further fair use analyses, the Classroom 
Guidelines effectively defined the full extent of educational fair use 
available without litigation.131 
The Classroom Guidelines provide a more mathematical and 
rigid scheme than the four-factor fair use test for determining 
whether a use of copyrighted material is justified. The deceptive 
attraction of the Classroom Guidelines is their alleged simplicity of 
application, in contrast to the uncertainty in application of a fair use 
determination under 17 U.S.c. § 107. The criteria included in this 
determination-brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect-were 
defined in terms of raw amounts of material, regardless of import, 
in relation to the whole of the copyrighted workP2 In addition, the 
126. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 67 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 
V.S.C.C.AN. 5659, 5680. 
127. See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Edu­
cational Institutions (Classroom Guidelines), included in H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68­
70. 
128. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 67. 
129. Classroom Guidelines, Preamble, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68. 
130. See Crews, supra note 125, at 669-70 (indicating a willingness by the publish­
ers' groups to sue for any uses that fall outside the scope of established guidelines). The 
difference in position between educators and publishers only increased the natural dis­
parity between their respective power: as the copyright owners, the publishers would 
always be the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit. [d. at 678. As such, they would 
have complete control over whether a suit were threatened or actually filed. Librarians 
and educators, on the other hand, as the users of the copyrighted materials, would al­
ways be subject to the litigation decisions of the publishing community. In addition, the 
publishing community generally maintains a greater financial ability to mount a legal 
attack than the librarians and educators do to defend against one. Id. at 679. 
131. Id. at 669-70. 
132. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69. For example, the Classroom Guidelines 
permitted the copying of a single chapter, article, or short story for the use of the 
895 2007] LIBRARIANS WHO TEACH 
Guidelines include four bright-line prohibitions that remove a use 
from the realm of fair use. I33 There is no balancing of interests or 
weighing of factors. 
The first infringement suits for educational fair use to consider 
the Classroom Guidelines occurred in the early 1980s, not long af­
ter the implementation of the 1976 Act.134 A group of copyright 
owners, represented by the American Association of Publishers, 
sought to restrict certain copying practices at colleges and universi­
ties. To prevent future infringing actions by professors, the publish­
ers filed suit directly against New York University and several 
faculty members.135 As a condition of the suit's settlement, New 
York University and the professors agreed to abide by the Class­
room Guidelines. I36 The settlement indicated that the publishers 
viewed the Classroom Guidelines as a definitive statement of the 
furthest bounds of fair use, rather than as a safe harbor and state­
ment of the minimum permissible activities constituting fair use.137 
The effects of the New York University suit and settlement 
were far-reaching. While the original actions addressed by these 
early copy shop cases may have been egregious violations of copy­
right law, the settlements and protective policies restricted future 
activities further than was perhaps warranted by the fair use doc­
trine. Despite their lack of official status, the Classroom Guidelines 
were treated as governing the educational and library uses of copy­
righted materials by educators and librarians as well as publishers. 
teacher in preparation or teaching of a class, and multiple copies subject to restraints of 
brevity and spontaneity. Id. at 68. Brevity required that, for works of prose, the entire 
piece may only be used if it was less than 2,500 words; an excerpt was considered "not 
more than 1,000 words or 10% of the work, whichever is less," but allowed at least 500 
words, even for short pieces. Id. Similar mathematical restrictions exist for other types 
of original works. /d. at 68-69. 
133. Id. at 69-70. The Classroom Guidelines prohibited the following absolutely: 
using copied works "to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations 
or collective works"; "copying ... from works intended to be 'consumable' in the course 
of study or teaching"; copying as a "substitute for the purchase of books," copying at 
the direction of an authority higher than a classroom teacher, or copying in which the 
same item is copied term after term; charging students "beyond the actual cost of the 
photocopying." Id. 
134. Copyright Infringement and Photocopying for the Classroom: The Associa­
tion of American Publishers v. New York University Settlement, in 1983 ENTERTAIN­
MENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 313 (Michael Meyer & John David 
Viera eds., 1983); Crews, supra note 125, at 640. 
135. Crews, supra note 125, at 640 (citing Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. v. N.Y. 
Univ., No. 82-8333 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 14, 1982». 
136. Id. (citing Addison-Wesley Publ'g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-8333 (S.D.N.Y., 
filed Dec. 14, 1982». 
137. Id. at 641. 
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As a result, the publishers succeeded in limiting the user of copy­
righted materials to the publishers' views of what a fair use should 
be through superior nerve and litigious power.138 
4. Copy Shop Cases 
Courts have only addressed the Classroom Guidelines in cases 
involving commercial uses by for-profit copy shops,139 The most 
prominent of the copy shop cases are Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's 
Graphics Corp. 140 and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Doc­
ument Services, Inc. 141 In both cases, the commercial uses weighed 
against a finding of fair use, despite their connection with educa­
tional uses. 
In Basic Books, a corporate copy shop was sued for infringe­
ment as a result of services marketed towards college professors.142 
After finding that the uses involved were not fair, the court dis­
cussed the Classroom Guidelines, and concluded that the uses the 
defendant made of the copyrighted material also fell far outside the 
intended boundaries of the Classroom Guidelines.143 The applica­
ble provision of the Classroom Guidelines was one of the bright­
line prohibitions, which automatically excluded an anthology from 
qualifying as a fair use. Notably, the court accepted the defendant's 
position to "seek a less rigid view" of the Guidelines than the abso­
lute prohibitions included in its text,144 despite ultimately finding 
for the plaintiffs.145 At least in this instance, and to the extent that 
the court rejected the bright line prohibition, the Guidelines have 
been rejected as accurately representing the bounds of fair use. 
138. Later attempts at voluntary guidelines for educators were destined to fail 
even to gain the level of acceptance of the Classroom Guidelines. See id. at 622-38 
(describing the failure of the CONTU and CONFU guidelines to gain general 
acceptance). 
139. See id. at 664 ("No court has had such a case for actually testing the [Class­
room GJuidelines."). Since the distinction between commercial uses and nonprofit edu­
cational uses is significant under the first factor of a fair use analysis, the treatment of 
commercial uses may not be predictive of the treatment of a nonprofit use. See supra 
notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
140. Basic Books, Inc., v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
14l. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
142. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1522. 
143. Id. at 1534 (describing the instant copying as "grossly out of line with ac­
cepted fair use principles"). 
144. Id. at 1537. 
145. Id. at 1522. 
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In Princeton University Press, a for-profit copy shop compiled 
and sold course packs composed of excerpts of copyrighted works 
similar to those at issue in New York University and Basic Books.146 
Fair use was not found in this case either, as the copying was sub­
stantial and strictly for profit.147 The court here described the 
Classroom Guidelines as providing only "general guidance," and, 
before finding that the use was not fair, described the copying at 
issue as "light years away from" the type of fair use described as 
appropriate in the Guidelines.148 The court did not rely on the 
Classroom Guidelines in reaching its decision. 
These copy shop cases identified some weaknesses in the Class­
room Guidelines. The Guidelines have not been regarded as a fully 
accurate statement of fair use law149 and their ability to withstand 
further judicial scrutiny is questionable at best. Although they have 
been greatly influential in defining current practices, they should 
not be used as a substitute for the fair use analysis. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Library uses of copyrighted materials that are sufficiently anal­
ogous to permitted classroom uses should be read as permissible 
uses under an expanded reading of TEACH. While some library 
activities clearly go beyond the scope of TEACH, and likewise 
some go beyond the scope of otherwise authorized actions with re­
gard to copyrighted materials, there are library actions that are 
most appropriately considered within the purview of TEACH. 
Part III.A considers the policies behind TEACH, and argues 
for the inclusion of appropriate library acts within its bounds. Li­
braries and educators can determine the appropriateness of uses by 
applying the criteria emphasized by the TEACH Act-classroom­
analogous use of copyrighted material as a regular part of a medi­
ated instructional activity, and the safeguarding of owners' property 
against other uses-as a balancing test.150 Historically, however, 
balancing tests do not serve the purposes of many libraries and edu­
146. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1383. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 1391. 
149. See Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1537. See generally Crews, supra note 125, 
at 641-43 (describing Basic Books as giving the Classroom Guidelines some "important 
credibility" but simultaneously "undercut[ting] the [G]uidelines"). 
150. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act of 
2002, Pub!. L. No. 107-273, § 13301,116 Stat 1758, 1910-13 (codified at 17 V.S.c. §§ 101, 
110, 112, 801 (Supp. 2004». 
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cational organizations. These organizations tend to avoid the mere 
specter of litigation.15] Thus, while a balancing test might provide 
an appropriate judicial test, it is unlikely to satisfy educational prac­
titioners. In the absence of a bright-line test, another analysis may 
be necessary for these organizations to act upon privileges. 
Part III.B proposes a combined fair useffEACH analysis. A 
fair use analysis can illuminate the inquiry in two ways. In terms of 
the TEACH balancing test, fair use factors can provide a frame­
work for considering the uses of non-owners compared to the need 
to protect the owners' property. Secondarily, libraries may be able 
to rely on fair use principles to determine whether a use intended is 
appropriate-not necessarily because it is TEACH-appropriate, but 
because a fair use analysis is a second way of justifying the uses of 
copyrighted materials by non-owners. Fair use concepts are more 
familiar to libraries and educators than the new strictures of 
TEACH.152 By restricting a fair use analysis to only activities that 
meet the threshold criteria for a TEACH use, a narrower range of 
possibilities is developed. These two justifications may provide a 
library with enough assurance that its judgment is correct to allow 
the activity to proceed, even in the face of its historical tendency to 
avoid litigation. 
Finally, Part III.C explores the ways in which libraries and 
classrooms are established as places of special privileges under 
other aspects of the copyright scheme. Due to this special and anal­
ogous status, libraries should be able to participate in TEACH 
activities. 
A. Achieving the Policies of TEACH by Including Libraries 
Reading TEACH to include libraries in the protected class of 
users can help more fully realize the policies intended by Congress. 
The objectives of TEACH are to encourage the modern forms of 
distance education, and to adapt the copyright law to emerging 
technologies used in such educational endeavors.153 Libraries are a 
vibrant and crucial part of modern higher education, and including 
libraries and librarians in TEACH protections enriches all educa­
tional endeavors. Expanding TEACH to include libraries, in the 
151. See supra Part II.B.3. 
152. Familiar fair use checklists can be used in this combined analysis as well. 
See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 65, at 21. 
153. H.R. REP. No. 107-687, at 2 (2002), micro/armed on CIS 02-H523-44 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.); S. REP. No. 107-31, at 3-4 (2001), micro/armed on CIS 01-S523-1 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.); 147 CONGo REc. 3011, 3012 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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context of the other restrictions that the Act establishes, does not 
disrupt the delicate balance between copyright owners and copy­
right users. 
The expansion of rights for distance education under TEACH 
is merely a technological updating of policies acted upon in the 
1976 revision. The current copyright laws explicitly include these 
new technologies.154 The copyright revision in 1976 included provi­
sions designed to enable educators to incorporate copyrighted 
materials in classroom presentations for pedagogical use.155 Addi­
tionally, presentations and displays were not limited to those used 
in the classroom, so hallway bulletin boards, announcements, and 
take-home materials could be incorporated.156 Applications involv­
ing distance education were included in the classroom exemption as 
far as they could be under then-existing technology.157 There was 
no deliberate exclusion of distance education from the educational 
exemption; the provision of distance education has simply ex­
panded in ways that were not anticipated by the drafters of the 1976 
statutes.158 The updating of the copyright statutes was one step to­
ward encouraging and enabling distance education. For a variety of 
reasons, including libraries in TEACH would be a further step in 
that direction. 
1. The Role of Libraries has Expanded Dramatically 
Libraries have become so intertwined with the "mediated ac­
tivities" of the instructional spectrum that it makes sense to include 
them under TEACH. While libraries sometimes serve as a mere 
tool of the educator, they also have independent existence. Simi­
larly, librarians often have other roles in education, namely as edu­
cators themselves. Because they serve the educational system in 
more than one way, the legal status of libraries and librarians is 
complicated. When libraries act as a mere tool, furthering the goals 
and intentions of the educators and at the educator's direction, they 
should be accorded a suitable status and be permitted to avail 
themselves of TEACH privileges. When they act on their own initi­
154. 147 CONGo REC. at 3012-13 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (introducing the 
TEACH Act). 
155. S. REP. No. 107-31, at 4. 
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2000) (pre-TEACH provision allowing displays as a 
part of "systematic instructional activities of a ... nonprofit educational institution"). 
157. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 7, at 77 (specifying radio and television 
delivery of distance education as prevalent during the 1960s and early 1970s). 
158. Id. at 9-19. 
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alive, their actions should be evaluated either as actions of educa­
tors (if that is factually appropriate) or as outside the bounds of 
TEACH. 
As libraries become more involved in the academic lives of the 
schools they serve, they become more closely tied to the mediated 
instructional activities that take place in these schools. Long gone 
are the days of the library simply as a place to check out books. 
Libraries today are proactive in their approaches to research.159 Li­
brarians readily step outside the walls of the library to inform stu­
dents and faculty of all the benefits the library can offer.160 This 
activity can take the form of providing current awareness services, 
advice on research methods and tools, instruction on library-owned 
materials, and guidance on how to find information not owned by 
the library.161 
Additionally, librarians teach research classes and guest lecture 
in substantive classes. This proactive approach may also manifest 
itself in a librarian's visit to a classroom specifically to discuss on­
line library resources. In a distance education setting, these classes 
could be delivered in whatever way each class is normally taught. It 
might involve a professor discussing available resources with a li­
brarian in advance of creating student assignments. It would often 
include librarians ensuring access to library materials through the 
use of reserve collections or non-circulating material.162 
2. 	 Expanded Privileges are Limited to Accredited, 

Nonprofit Educational Organizations 

By the terms of the statute, TEACH privileges are limited to 
accredited nonprofit educational organizations, using legally ac­
159. See generally OUTREACH SERVICES IN ACADEMIC AND SPECIAL LIBRARIES 
(Paul Kelsey & Sigrid Kelsey eds., 2003). 
160. See ASSOCIATION FOR COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES, GUIDELINES 
FOR INSTRUCTION PROGRAMS IN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES (2003), available at http://www. 
ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/guidelinesinstruction.htm (identifying various methods of 
instruction used by academic librarians). 
161. Id. 
162. Reserve collections and non-circulating collections often evolve with the as­
sistance of faculty input. Reserve items, in particular, are often included in that collec­
tion at the behest of a faculty member, for the benefit of a particular class. Items that 
would normally circulate out of the library may be designated as non-circulating if a 
high demand is anticipated, as might be the case during the duration of a specialized 
seminar class. See, e.g., DRISCOLL, supra note 65, at 1; RAY PRYTHERCH, HARROD'S 
LIBRARIANS' GLOSSARY 540, 550 (8th ed. 1995); Melamut, supra note 99, at 158 'lI 1. 
These collections have increasingly been made available electronically. See DRISCOLL, 
supra note 65, at 1-5. 
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quired copies of copyrighted materials in a mediated instructional 
activity.163 Thus, libraries that take advantage of TEACH must be 
nonprofit educational organizations, if not standing alone, then as 
part of a larger organization. The requirement of accreditation and 
the nonprofit status of the organization sponsoring the class is an 
attempt to limit the benefit of TEACH to bona fide educational 
organizations.164 As this is an extension of a statutory exemption to 
a statutory right, it is appropriate that the limitation be as narrowly 
drawn as possible to achieve the objective soughU65 By limiting 
the pool in this way Congress allows the majority of verifiably edu­
cational users to take advantage of TEACH, while minimizing the 
number of legitimate users who are inevitably and unfortunately 
excluded. 
In light of these reasonable and considered limitations, the li­
braries that should be permitted to come within the TEACH privi­
leges are simply those that are part of accredited nonprofit 
educational organizations. As this reasonably approximates the 
type of educational organizations that Congress was intending to 
encourage and assist by enacting the privileges, it is appropriate 
that these organizations' libraries be the ones that are permitted to 
exercise the greater privileges. 
3. 	 TEACH Privileges are Limited to Mediated Instructional 
Activities 
TEACH privileges are granted only for "mediated instruc­
tional activities."166 These activities are displays of copyrighted 
materials that are analogous to what would be used in a classroom 
setting.167 This poses a challenge to supporters of a TEACH ex­
emption for libraries: historically, libraries have supported a part of 
the curriculum separate from that explored within the classroom 
163. Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301(b), 116 Stat. 1758, 1910 (codified at 17 u.s.c. 
§ 110(2) (Supp. 2004». 
164. S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9 (2001), microformed on CIS 01-S523-1 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.). 
165. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION §47:25 (6th 
ed. 2000) (discussing the limitation on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius: 
that a statute authorizing a specific course of action generally excludes others not men­
tioned, but that this presumption may be overcome by "a strong indication of contrary 
legislative intent or policy"). 
166. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1) (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 110(2) (Supp. 
2004». 
167. S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9-10. 
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setting.168 Congress explicitly disallowed the use of TEACH privi­
leges to display material in support of individualized research, such 
as for term papers.169 It is not suggested here that these uses now 
be permitted. However, the range of activities engaged in by librar­
ies today goes beyond mere support for research outside the class­
room. Many libraries have outreach programs in which librarians 
tailor presentations toward the educational needs of the class and 
work closely with professors to acquire materials for use in the 
classroom.170 Those activities that pertain closely to "mediated in­
structional activities" should be allowed under this expanded read­
ing of TEACH. Some activities that libraries engage in will not 
qualify, but others may, depending on the depth of connection with 
"mediated instructional activities." 
The primary issue is whether copyrighted material is provided 
within a mediated instructional activity. If the correct party has 
provided the material in the correct context, TEACH should pro­
tect that activity. The levels of support and interaction the library 
or librarian has with the instructor may help indicate the depth of 
connection between the library activity and the "mediated instruc­
tional activity." The following hypothetical situations explore the 
attitude copyright law should assume with regard to librarians' and 
libraries' actions.l7l The levels of support and interaction the li­
brary or librarian has with the instructor may help indicate the 
168. See generally THE EVOLVING EDUCATIONAL MISSION OF THE LIBRARY 
(Betsy Baker & Mary Ellen Litzinger eds., 1992). 
169. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 10. 
170. For an examination of various incarnations of library outreach programs, 
see, e.g., Corey M. Johnson et aI., Instructional Outreach Across the Curriculum: En­
hancing the Liaison Role at a Research University, in OUTREACH SERVICES IN ACA­
DEMIC AND SPECIAL LIBRARIES, supra note 159, at 19 (describing various models for 
instructional outreach programs in academic libraries); Jill S. Markgraf, Collaboration 
Between Distance Education Faculty and the Library: One Size Does Not Fit All, in 
DISTANCE LEARNING LIBRARY SERVICES: THE TENTH OFF-CAMPUS LIBRARY SER­
VICES CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 451 (discussing one library's efforts to work more 
closely with distance education faculty to provide services to students); Tom Reidel, 
Added Value, Multiple Choices: Librarian/Faculty Collaboration in Online Course De­
velopment, in DISTANCE LEARNING LIBRARY SERVICES: THE TENTH OFF-CAMPUS LI­
BRARY SERVICES CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 477 (discussing the recent prevalence 
of library programs proactively reaching out to faculty teaching distance education 
courses). 
171. Assume for the following set of scenarios that the material involved is the 
same piece of legally acquired, copyrighted, non-dramatic work. Such works are per­
missibly used in the distance education setting. TEACH Act of 2002, § 13301(b)(1). 
Assume that the organization involved is an accredited nonprofit university, and that 
the technological safeguard requirements are also met. See id. 
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depth of connection between the library activity and the "mediated 
instructional activity." 
Consider first the technologically savvy professor. Perhaps 
Professor Smiler is adept with technology and delights in keeping 
up with the latest advances in distance education mechanisms. In 
this case, he would likely take material to be used for the class pres­
entation and post it himself to the course space. This clearly falls 
within the language of the statute and would qualify for the 
TEACH exemptions. It satisfies the "by, [or] at the direction of" 
requirement, as the educator is posting the material himself.I72 
Next, consider the technologically insecure professor. Not all 
college professors-indeed not all distance education professors­
are as adept with technology as they should be. In many instances, 
the library serves as a vehicle for completing the mere task of mak­
ing materials available electronically to students. The librarian, 
Scott, may post material selected by Professor Smiler, exactly 
where the professor would likely have posted it himself: the estab­
lished course space. In that instance, should it make a difference 
who has actually posted the material, provided it was selected and 
analyzed by the professor and made available at his request? 
Surely not; this too should qualify for the TEACH exemptions. 
There are no policies encouraged by TEACH that are not protected 
by this use, provided that the work is undertaken at the direction of 
the educator. If Professor Smiler has requested that Scott do the 
work, this should satisfy even a very narrow reading of "at the di­
rection of" indicated in the legislative history.I73 It is as though 
Scott is merely "initiating the display," as Congress imagined might 
happen by a member of the classy4 
Next, consider the absentminded professor: a professor who 
can do the work technologically, but does not have an overall plan 
for distance education. Professor Smiler may not have the re­
sources required, or access to an appropriate course space. The li­
brary's resources may be simply the most efficient way of making 
the material available to students. Another way in which this could 
arise is by a deliberate choice at the administrative level. The li­
brary'S server space may be more suitable to hosting material of 
this type, due to logistical concerns, such as available disk space, 
frequency of back-ups scheduled, or available maintenance. It may 
172. Id. 
173. See S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9. 
174. See id. 
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have absolutely nothing to do with academic concerns. This func­
tion may be served by an office devoted to providing distance edu­
cation services, and Emily, the instructional technology designer, 
would be called upon. An accident of hardware logistics should not 
disqualify an otherwise valid exercise of TEACH privileges. Again, 
no policies are implicated that run counter to those of TEACH. As 
with the previous example, having Scott or Emily actually make the 
material available online falls within a very narrow reading of "at 
the direction of," and should certainly be permitted by any reading 
of TEACH. 
The final instance presented here is that of the eager librarian. 
This example requires more detail to determine its disposition. Af­
ter discussing Professor Smiler's new Gender Development class, 
Ken scours the available resources in the library, selects some for 
the use of the professor, and makes these works, including the 
copyrighted non-dramatic work in question, available online, di­
rectly from the library web page. Sensitive to copyright concerns, 
Ken password protects the material, and distributes the password 
only to Professor Smiler, for use by his class only. Ken has every 
intention of taking the site down once the semester has concluded. 
This situation speaks to the heart of the debate over the scope of 
"at the direction of" under the statute. 
If Professor Smiler has indicated a desire to use the materials 
in the classroom, Ken should be permitted to exercise his profes­
sional judgment in finding and selecting the materials for inclusion, 
and be entitled to TEACH protections. Academic librarians are 
experts in their collections and often, they are also experts in the 
subject matter.175 They are trained to evaluate and select useful 
information for their patrons.176 They are not indiscriminate prov­
iders of information, running amok digitizing the entire library. 
Here, Ken has a good faith belief that the educator will use digi­
tized materials in the process of teaching the class. The librarian is 
primarily acting as the agent of the educator in making the display 
possible. An action, permissible when taken by the principal, is 
175. See, e.g., AM. Assoc. OF LAW LIBRARIES, COMPETENCIES OF LAW LIBRARI· 
ANSHIP §§ 3.2, 3.3, 3.6 (2001), available at http://www.aallnet.orglprodev/competencies. 
asp. 
176. Assoc. OF COLL. AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES, JOINT STATEMENT ON 
FACULTY STATUS OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIANS (reaffirmed June 2001) 
(1972), available at http://www.a!a.orgla!alacrllacr!standards/jointstatementfacu!ty.htm; 
AM. Assoc. OF LAW LIBRARIES, supra note 175, §§ 3.2, 3.3, 3.6. 
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permissible when taken by an agent of the principal.177 The libra­
rian is enhancing the provision of distance education and fulfilling 
the objectives of TEACH by taking steps that go beyond the nar­
row "direction" described in the legislative history, while remaining 
consistent with the policy objectives underlying the statute. 
If Ken truly is running amok, however, with no indication that 
Professor Smiler desires the material for classroom use, this clearly 
falls outside of the aegis of even an expanded reading of the 
TEACH provisions. While the information is surely useful and 
helpful to the students in exploring the subject area, conducting re­
search, and even developing a private understanding of the class 
discussion, these are activities that are traditionally not mediated by 
Professor Smiler.178 They are educational, to be sure, but do not 
fall into the category of "mediated instructional activities."179 This 
use of materials more closely resembles those specifically exempted 
from coverage by the legislative history of TEACH: "e-reserves and 
digital library resources."180 
An expanded reading of TEACH is justified under a consider­
ation of the policies animating TEACH: those encouraging the ef­
fective provision of distance education, while simultaneously 
protecting the rights of copyright owners against excessive use of 
their materials. It should not matter who makes the material avail­
able. Allowing librarians to make copyrighted material available 
under the direction of professors retains the distinction between 
permissible classroom use and impermissible non-classroom use. 
4. 	 The Ambiguity of the TEACH Act Allows for a Broader 
Reading of the Language 
Conservative arguments note that TEACH, on its face, does 
not apply to libraries of any sort.181 A specific inclusion of libraries 
177. See 3 AM. lUR. 2D Agency § 74 (noting that the principal may authorize an 
agent to act to the extent of the principal's legal right to act); see also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 67 (8th ed. 2004) (definition of agency). 
178. See generally S. REP. No. 107-31, at 9-10 (describing the exemptions as cov­
ering activities that are "part of a class itself, rather than ancillary to it"). 
179. See 17 V.S.c. § 110 (Supp. 2004) (defining "mediated instructional activity" 
as an activity in which a copyrighted work is used "as an integral part of the class expe­
rience, controlled by or under the actual supervision of the instructor and analogous to 
the type of performance or display that would take place in a live classroom setting," 
and not as including works that would be a substitute for a purchased text). 
180. H.R. REP. No. 107-687, at 10 (2002), microformed on CIS 02-H523-44 
(Cong. Info. Serv.). 
181. See Hutchinson, supra note 4, at 2225-26. 
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would have been easy enough for Congress to enact, had it in­
tended to extend legislative permission for distance education dis­
plays of materials to libraries. Generally, unless the plain language 
of the statute is ambiguous, there is little reason for recourse to a 
convoluted interpretation of the legislative history to extend legisla­
tive privileges to a group not specifically mentioned.182 However, 
this rule does not preclude the consideration of legislative intent 
where the language is ambiguous. TEACH is ambiguous through 
its lack of definition regarding the "direction" of the instructor. 
TEACH is also arguably ambiguous when viewed in the context of 
the usual activities of an academic library. The statute fails to men­
tion libraries, and yet clearly addresses a subject matter often en­
countered by normally active libraries. Nearly all accredited 
educational organizations have libraries.183 This broader reading of 
the statute is justified by the complex realities of educational orga­
nizations and a recognition of the various ways in which these orga­
nizations act. Ambiguity in the copyright statutes should be 
resolved by consideration of the basic principles of copyright, espe­
cially the encouragement of socially useful endeavors such as edu­
cation and the progress of science and the arts.l84 
Publishers' groups may object to this expanded reading of 
TEACH, for it expands the circumstances under which non-owners 
can use copyrighted materials. These groups represent people who 
profit from the sale and licensing of copyrighted materials, so their 
economic interests are naturally affected by any such expansion. 
However, the limitations inherent in the Constitution require that 
the rights of owners not be absolute.185 These limitations form the 
basis of the classroom exemption, as well as the fair use doctrine. 
Congress has every right to define the extent of the exemption. In 
its wisdom, Congress has acted to encourage distance education, 
while simultaneously protecting the rights of copyright owners.186 
182. SINGER, supra note 165, § 46:01 (discussing the plain meaning rule). 
183. See, e.g., CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ELIGI· 
BILITY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION Standard 11, at 33 (Mid­
dle States Comm'n on Higher Educ. 2002), available at http://www.msache.org/msache/ 
contentlpdCfiles/characteristicsbook.pdf ("The availability and accessibility of ade­
quate learning resources, such as library services and the support of professional staff 
qualified by education, training and experience, are essential to an institution of higher 
education."). 
184. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 
(1984) (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
185. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
186. See supra Parts I.B, I.e. 
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This expansion, in requiring that the educational organization own 
a lawful copy of the item displayed, should not affect the market for 
the copyright owner's product.187 It merely facilitates access and 
encourages the use of the copyrighted material. 
B. A Fair Use Analysis of TEACH Uses by Libraries 
Although TEACH and fair use are two distinct copyright doc­
trines, they complement each other. An organization wary of litiga­
tion may be more likely to take advantage of potentially expanded 
rights when the use apparently satisfies the requirements of both 
TEACH and the fair use doctrine. In addition, a discussion of the 
fair use factors may shed light on the underlying principles of copy­
right, which also informs an understanding of the TEACH analysis. 
A fair use analysis of library use of copyrighted materials, 
under the restrictions imposed by TEACH, suggests that such use 
should usually be permitted under existing copyright law. Some 
key aspects of the analysis may be the same for all or many 
TEACH uses. A use pursuant to TEACH would, of necessity, be 
for an educational purpose; it would also be a nonprofit use.188 Ad­
ditionally, TEACH uses will often involve making electronic copies, 
which are then made available through technology. 
Admittedly, TEACH and the fair use doctrine are separate jus­
tifications for uses by non-owners. TEACH allows greater copy­
right permissions than were originally granted under the classroom 
exemption, while fair use provides an affirmative defense to an alle­
gation of copyright infringement. l89 They occupy different places in 
the copyright scheme, and there is no reason to confuse their pur­
poses. This Note does not, however, champion a mix of doctrines; 
the point is simply to look at the outlines of behavior possible under 
an expanded reading of TEACH, and examine that behavior under 
a fair use analysis. It is possible that a library following the guide­
lines of the TEACH permissions would be thus brought quite safely 
within the bounds of fair use, by virtue of the TEACH restrictions 
and the nature of library services. It is also possible that this analy­
sis can highlight behaviors that libraries should avoid. 
Additional privileges for libraries under a fair use analysis are 
only relevant as a predictive device if the publishers of material are 
187. See 17 U.S.c. § 110 (Supp. 2004). 
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of 
TEACH). 
189. PATRY, supra note 78, at 413. 
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in agreement with regard to the analysis. Given the history of the 
copyright disputes between libraries and publishers, and the slip­
pery nature of fair use determinations in general, it is easy to pre­
dict that libraries will be reluctant to take advantage of potential 
new privileges, and publishers will be skeptical of accepting them as 
legitimate. However, if the issue were ever to be litigated190 and 
this fair use analysis holds, new privileges could very well be estab­
lished for academic libraries under the TEACH provisions. In ad­
dition, fair use determinations are commonplace in libraries; the 
familiarity of these considerations provides comfort that new legis­
lative enactments do not. 
1. 	 Factor 1: Purpose of the Use 
In a TEACH-like use, the first factor always indicates a possi­
ble fair use. The first factor, purpose of the use, leans towards a fair 
use when it is an educational or other non-commercial use.191 Edu­
cational uses could be instructional or scholarly. Other uses leaning 
towards fair use are those authorized by the statute, including com­
ment or criticism of a work. These are also typical elements of a 
work presented in a classroom setting. This factor tends to indicate 
a use that requires permission, when it is a commercial use, for pub­
lication, or for public distribution. A use pursuant to TEACH is 
necessarily an instructional use, due to the "mediated instructional 
activity" requirement.192 Although this factor leans towards a fair 
use, the other factors must still be weighed. 
2. 	 Factor 2: Nature and Character of the Copyrighted 
Work 
The second factor may lean towards or away from a determina­
tion of fair use in a TEACH setting. This factor favors published, 
factual, and non-fiction materials for a fair use determination, and 
disfavors any unpublished or creative works.193 TEACH uses may 
be made of favored or disfavored materials: they may be of works 
either published or unpublished, provided they are obtained legally. 
Similarly, use may be made of factual, non-fiction or fictional liter­
ary or artistic works. The TEACH Act specifically authorizes the 
190. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (detailing the history of interactions of the 
library/educational and publishing industries in copyright matters); see also Crews, 
supra note 125. 
191. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83. 
192. 17 U.S.c. § 1l0(1)(A). 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
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use of "nondramatic literary or musical work[s]."194 Thus, the 
TEACH limitations do not affect the second factor of a fair use 
analysis. 
3. Factor 3: Amount of the Copyrighted Work 
The third factor to consider is the amount of the work used in 
comparison to the whole of the copyrighted work, which might also 
weigh for or against fair use. As discussed above, this may refer to 
an actual amount, or the "most important parts of the work."195 
The language of TEACH suggests that an educator may per­
missibly use the entirety of some works, while they may only use 
portions of others: copyright is not infringed by "the performance 
of a nondramatic literary or musical work or reasonable and limited 
portions of any other work, or display of a work" provided the 
amount is "an amount comparable to that which is typically dis­
played in the course of a live classroom session."196 No amount 
limitation is specified beyond this comparison to what would be 
presented in a live classroom. For other works, including dramatic 
literary works, TEACH does impose a specific amount limitation: 
only a "reasonable and limited portion[]" of the work may be 
used.197 
While that phrase has not been statutorily defined, the legisla­
tive history indicates that a determination of reasonableness here 
would consider "the nature of the market for that type of work and 
the pedagogical purposes of the performance."198 This definition is 
as undefined as the fair use factor, although slightly different. 
TEACH seems to rely on the custom of mainstream educators; 
Congress may assume that most instructors are not interested in 
wasting class time. Since an educator's use of an entire work may 
be fair, the statute's authorization of the use of the entirety of liter­
ary and musical works does not remove the TEACH-permissible 
uses from possible determinations of fair use. The third factor 
194. 17 U.S.c. § 110(2). The prior version of the statute excluded these works 
from the classroom exemption. 17 U.S.c. § 110(2) (2000) (pre-TEACH language). 
195. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing the possibility that a use which is mathematically 
a small amount of the copyrighted work might still not be a fair use because it uses the 
best portions of the copyrighted work). But see supra note 132 (discussing the mathe­
matical calculations of the Classroom Guidelines). 
196. 17 U.S.c. § 110(2) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). 
197. Id. 
198. S. REP. No. 107-31, at 7-8 (2001), microformed on CIS 01-S523-1 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.). 
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could easily weigh for or against fair use when only a portion of the 
work is used. When an entire work is used, this factor may weigh 
against a fair use determination, but does not remove it from the 
possibility of being fair. 
4. Factor 4: Effect upon the Market of the Original Work 
The final statutory factor of the fair use analysis examines the 
market effect of the use on the original copyrighted work, and 
likely weighs towards a fair use here. The market for the original 
work is affected when the likelihood of people purchasing or licens­
ing the original work decreases as a result of the secondary use.199 
This most often occurs when the demand for the secondary work 
replaces or supplants the demand for the original, as in the case of 
an abridgement or an annotation, or when free access to the 
"heart" of the original is provided in a more digestible format. Re­
peated use or multiple copies made of a work for non-educational 
purposes weigh against a determination of fair use; however, 
TEACH requires technological limitations on transmissions that ef­
fectively prevent students from retaining copies and using them re­
peatedly.2OO This does not affect the other side of the equation, 
however. Teachers are still able, under TEACH, to use material 
term after term. It is possible that repeated uses by instructors may 
tip this factor away from a fair use determination. Despite possible 
repeated use, the factor may weigh in favor of fair use if the market 
is either unaffected or stimulated by the use. Either of these is 
likely to occur in an educational setting. It is likely that the market 
would be unaffected; many students are manifestly uninterested in 
pursuing further research or reading in an area of class discussion 
after the course has ended.201 For those students who are still inter­
199. Melamut, supra note 99, at 183, 'lI 78 (indicating that loss of revenues from 
licensing satisfies the market harm factor). 
200. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1l0(2)(C), (D)(ii)(I) (requiring that institutions "appl[y] tech· 
nological measures that reasonably prevent retention of the work in accessible form by 
recipients of the transmission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than 
the class session; and unauthorized further dissemination of the work in accessible form 
by such recipients to others"). 
201. See Matthew Chavez, Students Sell Books Themselves, DAILY LOBO (Univ. 
of N.M.) (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.dailylobo.comlmedia/storage/paper 
344/news/2004/08/271N ews/S tudents.Sell.Books. Themselves· 706300.shtml (noting that 
many students opt to sell books outside of bookstore buyback systems); Nat'l Ass'n of 
Coll. Stores, FAQ on Used Books, http://www.nacs.orglcommonlresearchlfaq_used 
books.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (reporting that approximately 30 percent of all 
college text sales are of used books); BOOK INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP, USED BOOK 
MARKET ANALYSIS: INITIAL PREVIEW 7, 23 (2005), available at http://www.bisg.orgl 
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ested in the material, if the copies used during class are no longer 
available to them, as provided under the requirements of TEACH, 
they may seek out the original works to purchase. Thus, an educa­
tional use may actually improve the market for a work. In such a 
case, a repeated use of works may, over time, dramatically increase 
the market for these works. At worst, the market is unlikely to be 
negatively impacted, as long as the technological restrictions func­
tion as intended. Therefore, the fourth factor of the fair use analy­
sis is likely met by a TEACH-permissible use. 
5. 	 A Synthesis of Fair Use Factors Suggests TEACH Uses 
by Academic Libraries are Permissible 
Under TEACH conditions, the fair use analysis is fairly simple, 
and is likely satisfied. The first factor, purpose, weighs towards fair 
use by definition, unless there is some additional commercial over­
tone to the use. The second factor, nature, is not determinative of 
fair use; however, in modern fair use jurisprudence this factor may 
have lost some importance. Its effect may well be minimal. The 
third factor, the amount of the work used, probably weighs towards 
fair use for most works other than nondramatic literary and musical 
works. For nondramatic literary and musical works, when used in 
their entirety under TEACH, fair use is still not precluded, but de­
pends more heavily on the other three factors. The fourth factor, 
market effect, most likely weighs in favor of a fair use determina­
tion. Taken as a whole, an analysis of the factors indicates that a 
fair use determination is, indeed, likely in most cases.202 
Where nondramatic literary and musical works are used in 
their entirety, the combination of the TEACH technological pre­
ventative measures and the likely market effect still indicate a po­
tential finding of fair use. Even if a work is presented in whole, a 
student would be prevented from making a personal copy of the 
work to add to his library of pirated music. Thus, the market harm 
potentially caused by the use of the entire work should be reasona­
docsIBISG_Used_Book_Study_Preview.pdf (reporting $1.6 million in used books sales 
just in the educational sector, of $2.2 million industry wide in 2002, and that nearly 75 
percent of students recommend purchasing used books). Together, these figures indi­
cate a likelihood that many college students are uninterested in keeping course materi­
als longer than the duration of the course. 
202. Naturally, the specifics of each situation must be examined in each instance. 
A mere likelihood or statistical probability that fair use may apply in most cases in no 
way justifies any actual instance of use. 
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bly prevented by the TEACH provisions. That confluence of fac­
tors should mitigate the effect of using the entire work. 
C. 	 Existing Policy Suggests Copyright Law Already Treats 
Libraries and Educational Settings Similarly 
A third justification for an expanded reading of TEACH relies 
on the position libraries hold within copyright law. Both libraries 
and educational settings are in similarly privileged positions within 
copyright law: they receive similar and expanded privileges in the 
copyright scheme compared to other settings. It may be reasonable 
to consider permitting one to take advantage of privileges granted 
to the other when the positions are analogous and provided appro­
priate safeguards are maintained. Given that the services provided 
by libraries in educational settings have evolved into a more analo­
gous position with educators since this scheme was established, now 
is an appropriate time for such reconsideration.203 
1. 	 Statutory Exemptions Included in the 1976 Copyright 
Revision 
Two of the major exemptions to the copyright laws as estab­
lished in 1976 are the exemptions for libraries, under § 108, and for 
educational displays, under § 110.204 Under § 108, libraries are 
given broader copyright exemptions with regard to photocopies 
made in or by libraries. Copyright law permits libraries to provide 
copies of their materials to other libraries through interlibrary 
loans, without interference from copyright laws.20s The exemption 
represents statutory permission tailored to reflect the kinds of ser­
vices that libraries provide, which Congress and the courts have de­
termined are socially useful.206 Given libraries' present activities in 
203. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 10, 159-162. 
204. 	 17 U.S.c. §§ 108, 110 (2000). 
205. Interlibrary loan involves the sharing between libraries of purchased materi­
als, for the benefit of other libraries' users. JOAN M. REITZ, DICTIONARY FOR LIBRARY 
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 367 (2004); see also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973) (discussing the copyright implications of the interlibrary 
loan system prior to the 1976 revisions); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 78 (1976) (Conf. 
Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.CC.A.N. 5659,5691 (indicating that the 1976 revisions 
to the Copyright Act were not intended to prevent libraries from engaging in inter­
library loan, provided that they do not use this system to avoid purchasing original 
works). 
206. Permission for interlibrary loans also suggests that Congress is intentionally 
permitting libraries to share the use of copyrighted works only owned by one of the 
libraries involved in the exchange. The implications of this observation fall outside the 
scope of this Note. 
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the socially useful endeavor of distance education, additional privi­
leges may well be deserved, despite library activities having been 
overlooked thus far by Congress. 
Section 110, in its entirety, permits classroom and distance edu­
cation displays of certain copyrighted materials for pedagogical pur­
poses.207 This, too, is tailored to reflect the customary activities in 
the educational setting. Since the libraries under consideration in 
this piece are only those attached to accredited,. nonprofit educa­
tional institutions, some conflation of the statutory library exemp­
tion and the statutory distance education exemption may be 
appropriate. Just as the changing nature of distance education has 
been recognized by statute, so too should there be recognition of 
the changing role of libraries within academia. 
2. 	 Special Privileges are Granted to Libraries and 

Educational Institutions Under the Digital 

Millennium Copyright Act 

Additionally, in other areas of copyright law, libraries and edu­
cational institutions are identified as bodies deserving special per­
mISSIOns. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
generally allows copyright owners to embed in any digital medium 
technological protective devices to prevent the making of unautho­
rized copies.208 Reverse engineering technology to avoid or circum­
vent these devices is illegal; the possession of such technology is 
also illegal. The DMCA, however, permits libraries and educa­
tional institutions to legally possess and use such circumvention 
technology.209 This is a legislative demonstration that libraries and 
educational institutions occupy a special, protected place within 
copyright law and is further evidence that libraries and educational 
organizations are entitled to similar copyright privileges. 
CONCLUSION 
An expanded reading of TEACH, allowing libraries to take ad­
vantage of further uses of copyrighted materials then previously al­
lowed by statute, honors the delicate balance between the rights of 
the copyright owners and the needs of society. Congress has de­
207. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (Supp. 2004). 
208. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) 
(2000). 
209. § 1201(d); Sharp, supra note 57, at 41 (acknowledging the permissions 
granted, and discussing the practical problems of obtaining such otherwise illegal 
technology). 
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dared a policy of encouraging distance education. Allowing librar­
ies and librarians into the fold of protected users effectuates that 
policy, and aligns it with the reality of academic library activities. It 
does not threaten the profits to be rightfully made by copyright 
owners. 
Many instances of libraries taking advantage of these TEACH 
privileges may also be considered fair uses. Some might argue that 
nothing is therefore gained by including libraries within TEACH. 
The recent history of libraries and copyright law says otherwise. 
An action with two legal justifications is much more attractive to a 
party trying to avoid litigation, than an act resting on only one. 
While fair use does not provide a bright line justification, the deter­
mination is familiar to libraries, and often used. 
Copyright is not, and will never be, a simple and clear-cut area 
of law. There will always be risks involved for those who would 
take full advantage of the rights afforded to non-owners. An ex­
pansive reading of TEACH, induding libraries in its provisions, 
would decrease the anxiety of libraries that participate in distance 
education and fulfill the policies Congress established. 
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